This paper examines the claim that expansion of the voting franchise has been an important factor in the growth of government. State government spending and state and local spending are explained using a panel of 46 states for 1950-88. Elimination of poll taxes and literacy tests led to higher turnout, particularly among the poor, and a poorer pivotal voter. As predicted, we find that these changes, a fall in the income of voters relative to state income, and the ouster of Republicans from state government led to a sharp rise in welfare spending but no change in other spending.
I. Introduction
A complete explanation of the large growth and change in the composition of government spending over time has eluded economists working in public finance and in public choice. Meltzer and Richard (1978 , 1981 , 1983 
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The empirical evidence on the relationship between changes in the voting franchise and the growth in government expenditures is somewhat inconsistent. Peltzman (1980) , in a cursory examination of the data, finds that total government spending did not surge following expansions of the voting franchise in Great Britain, Canada, and the United States. He concludes that the "data are too crude to rule out a connection between suffrage and the size of government ... [but do] suggest that the major changes in the size of government have little to do with extension of the franchise" (p. 254). Voter participation in school budget referenda does not have a consistent impact on educational spending in Inman's (1978) study of 58 Long Island school districts. Mueller and Murrell (1986) , in a cross-sectional study of 28 countries, find that countries with higher voter turnout had higher government spending, but Murrell (1985) uses a somewhat smaller sample of OECD countries and finds no significant relationship between voter turnout and the share of public employment in total employment.2 Finally, the expansion of the voting franchise is unrelated to changes in the size of the governmental sector in the Brosio and Marchese (1988) examination of Italy between 1866 and 1914.
Despite the lack of statistical support and indeed the meager evidence to the contrary, the expansion of the voting franchise is often cited as an important factor in the growth of government over the last several centuries (see, e.g., Mueller's [1989, pp. 326-33] survey of public choice). Additional evidence clearly is necessary to ascertain whether the expansion of the voting franchise is responsible for the recent growth in government spending. Moreover, is the effect on nonredistributive expenditures different from that on redistributive spending, as theory implies?
In order to answer these questions, we examine state (and local) government spending in the United States using biennial data for 1950-88 (1958-88) . This sample allows us to estimate the effects of the removal by the federal government of two major impediments to voter participation in some states as a result of the Voting Rights Acts: poll taxes and literacy tests. Removal of these barriers had profound effects on voter registration and turnout in these states. For example, the estimated percentage of voting-age blacks registered in the Old South states increased from 24.9 percent in 1956 to 62 percent in 1968, primarily as a result of the Voting Rights Act of 2These results may be different because of the use of different dependent variables. The number of government workers is more closely related to the amount of government services provided than is total government spending, which includes welfare spending. 1948, 1960, 1968, and 1980 , show that literacy tests lowered voter turnout among the poorly educated and had the greatest impact on the turnout of blacks and that poll taxes sharply reduced voter turnout, particularly for those with low incomes. Thus we can conclude that exploring the effects of doing away with these devices provides evidence on how expanding the voting franchise to the poor affects the level and composition of government spending.
But this evidence is indirect, since expanding the franchise affects spending by raising voter turnout, particularly among the poor, and lowering the average income of those who are voting. We also provide direct evidence on the effects on spending caused by changes in the income of a state's voters relative to that of its population and whether state government is controlled by Republicans, primarily as representatives of the upper tail of the income distribution, or Democrats, as representatives of the lower tail.
Before we turn to the empirical analysis, we summarize how welfare spending is determined under the pure redistribution model of Meltzer and Richard (1978 , 1981 , 1983 ) as well as other major models of redistributive spending. We then review the government services model of Lovell (1975) and Kenny (1978) , provide some background on poll taxes and literacy tests, and indicate how we measure their indirect impact on spending and the direct impact on spending of the income of voters relative to state income.
II. Review of Redistribution and Government
Services Models Meltzer and Richard's simple model of pure redistribution can be criticized for being based on assumptions that do not accurately depict the existing tax/transfer programs. Transfer recipients in these programs have income well below the mean or median income levels. Since the median voter would not be a beneficiary in this system, an alternative theoretical framework is required to explain the level of redistribution expenditures. The theories most often advanced to explain welfare payments allow the median voter to receive some benefit from providing welfare for the poor or rely on interest group influence of the poor.
Median Voter Models Based on Altruism or on Social Insurance
Redistribution also can be obtained within a median voter framework by assuming that the median voter, who is not a welfare recipient, is motivated by altruism toward the poor (or by a concern over crime or social unrest). Altruism is usually modeled by adding transfer benefit levels, poverty population coverage, or the distribution of income to the median voter's utility function. In these pure altruism models, expenditure on redistribution rises as the median voter's income rises. Thus a fall in the income of the median voter due to enfranchising the poor should lower welfare spending.5 The empirical literature based on these pure altruism models uses the average or median income of the state rather than of the state's voters. Of course, this is not a problem if everyone votes or the composition of the voting population does not change. This literature has not considered the effect of changes in the decisive voter's income due to changes in the voting franchise. An alternative framework allows redistribution to result from both altruism and self-interest. For example, Husted (1989) and Epple ' The effect on the tax rate depends on a parameter of the Stone-Geary utility function and could be positive or negative; in the Cobb-Douglas case, the tax rate is invariant to changes in mean income. As mean income rises, this tax rate is applied to greater income, which results in higher welfare payments.
I Empirical tests of this median voter theory by Orr (1976) , Moffitt (1984) , and Baumgardner (1993) provide mixed support for this framework.
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and Romano (1996) recognize that the self-interest of potential or current welfare recipients will cause them to vote with the altruistic rich for higher welfare payments. Enfranchising the poor brings to the voting booth (1) welfare recipients, who favor a more generous system, and (2) other poor who are not potential welfare recipients and favor lower payments. In this altruism/self-interest model, the new median voter favors greater welfare payments, and redistribution increases if the new welfare recipient voters outnumber the other new poor voters.
Under another scenario, redistribution is valued by the selfinterested median voter as social insurance against an unforeseen or temporary loss of income or employment. Because higher-income individuals have alternative safety nets (e.g., private savings or unemployment insurance) or are unlikely to suffer the degree of loss necessary to make them eligible for government redistribution benefits, a negative income elasticity is expected.6 Since it results in a new, poorer median voter, enfranchising the poor in this social insurance model is predicted to raise redistributive expenditures.
Special Interest Group Model
One can also explain welfare expenditure levels through a special interest group model, based on the theoretical models of Peltzman (1976) and Becker (1983) . In this framework, vote-maximizing politicians balance the votes gained from the poor (and possibly welfare providers) against the votes lost from other groups because of higher taxes on all taxpayers for larger welfare benefits.7 The sign of the income elasticity in this model is unclear. Legislation that enfranchises more of the recipient population allows the poor to deliver more votes for favorable legislation without incurring any additional organizational cost and thus should result in greater welfare expenditures. 
B. Government Services
where t is the tax rate. In this services model, taxes finance a level of government services (G) that is consumed by all in the jurisdiction. More specifically, the government budget constraint requires that total revenue equal total expenditure:
where total community income equals MC, PG represents the price of each unit of government services produced, and N equals the number of individuals in the community. Solving (2) for t, we get
where Mm is mean income. Substituting equation ( The individual budget lines in a particular jurisdiction with mean income Mm all have the same government services intercept (Mm/PG), and the relative price of government services is proportional to Mi/Mm, the ratio of the individual's income to mean income. Lovell uses specific utility functions to ascertain whether the level of government services preferred by a community's poorer citizens is greater than that preferred by its richer residents. As we move down a community's income distribution, the relative price of government services, PG (Mi/Mm), falls, resulting in a substitution toward more government services. On the other hand, the poorer citizen is worse off and demands fewer government services. On net, the poor demand more government services if the substitution effect dominates the income effect. Kenny (1978) , generalizing Lovell's work, shows that this occurs when the elasticity of substitution between government services and private consumption is greater than the income elasticity for government services. Equivalently, the poor demand more government services if the uncompensated price elasticity for government services is greater than its income elasticity.9
Thus an expansion of the voting franchise that adds voters from the lower end of the income distribution will result in greater spending on government services only if its price elasticity exceeds its income elasticity. As noted in the Introduction, most estimates of these two elasticities contradict this assumption.
III. Poll Taxes and Literacy Tests
Violence, the white primary, poll taxes, literacy tests, multiple ballot boxes, and other devices were employed over the years to restrict minorities and the poor from voting, particularly in the southern states. Over time a number of these practices were eliminated, and by the late 1950s, the remaining two major obstacles to full political participation were the poll tax and the literacy test.
A. Poll Tax
In the 
B. Empirical Model
Our theory predicts that expanding the voting franchise results in a poorer decisive voter, which increases expenditures on pure redistribution but, because of conflicting income and substitution effects, 13 In years with a presidential election, turnout in that election is used. In other years, we relied on turnout for a governor's race, a Senate race, or House races, in descending order of preference.
14 The classification structure used by the census for governmental finances was revised extensively in 1951, and in that year revised data for 1950 were reported in an appendix in State Govemment Finances. 
and Zeckhauser 1993; Gilligan and Matsusaka 1995). To capture income effects, we include real federal grants per capita (FEDERAL GRANTS) and real personal income per capita (PERSONAL INCOME). 7
In this study, it is important to take account of the number of potential welfare recipients, and three variables taken from census data are used to measure the number of poor families in each state. INCOME SPREAD equals the difference between the first-and thirdquartile family incomes, divided by median family income. The firstand third-quartile incomes are estimated through interpolation from census tables giving the income distribution. The other two variables measure the percentage of the state's population who are black (PERCENT BLACK) and who are aged 65 or older (PERCENT ELDERLY). Values for all three variables in the intercensus years are estimated by interpolating between the census years values, which necessarily produces some measurement error.
Workers in urban areas receive higher wages to compensate for the higher cost of living, which makes government services more expensive in urban areas. Since the price elasticity appears to be less than one, this results in higher government expenditures on services in large urban areas. PERCENT METROPOLITAN equals the per-69 centage of the population living in standard metropolitan statistical areas.
There is considerable evidence that electoral competition is better characterized by candidates offering divergent platforms than by a Downsian solution in which candidates' platforms converge to the position preferred by the median voter."8 Even though elected officials from different parties often vote differently, few studies have found that their political affiliation affects the spending levels they choose.'9 We measure party effects by DEMOCRATIC CONTROL, which equals one if Democrats control both legislative houses and the governor's mansion, negative one if Republicans control the legislative and executive branches, and zero otherwise.20 Because Democrats and Republicans appear to represent the lower and upper tails of the income distribution, respectively, DEMOCRATIC CONTROL should have a positive coefficient if preferred spending rises as income falls.
We also include state and year dummy variables to control for otherwise unmeasured or omitted state-specific and year-specific fixed effects. State dummies capture time-invariant cross-sectional differences in amenities and "tastes" for government programs as well as institutional structure. The period dummy variables pick up changes over time in the relative price of government services, the federal government's state grants-in-aid programs, national business cycle conditions, and nationwide tastes for redistribution programs. 
Effects of Shifting the Pivotal Voter on Welfare Spending
The pure redistribution models of Meltzer and Richard (1978 , 1981 , 1983 ) and Tridimas (1993) Since the DEMOCRATIC CONTROL results in tables 3 and 4 and in tables 5 and 6 are mostly redundant, its results are summarized using its four coefficients from tables 5 and 6. With a two-tailed test, 11 of these 16 coefficients are significant at the 5 percent level and one is significant at the 10 percent level. DEMO-CRATIC CONTROL, although significant in the other three specifications, is insignificant in the state log-log model, and only one of the four LITERACY TEST coefficients is significant (and negative). Since poll taxes have been found to have a much stronger impact on turnout than literacy tests, it is not surprising that welfare spending is affected much more by poll taxes than by literacy tests.
Several additional regressions have been estimated to ascertain whether these results are a statistical artifact.2' The relative income measure (INCOMEvOTER/INCOMEpop) was created using voter turnout, which is higher in presidential elections than in other elections.
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Regressions comparable to those in tables 5 and 6 but restricted to presidential election years were estimated to make sure the relative income results were not due to the use of turnout from different types of elections. The results for INCOMEvOTER/INCOMEpop are reported in column 1 of table 7. In the state and local regressions, the variable is significant at the 5 percent level in the linear specification and at the 10 percent level in the log-log specification; the variable is not, however, significant in the state regressions. To determine whether the relative income results are attributable to otherwise unmeasured regional effects, we divided the full sample into two regions and estimated separate regressions for each region. Results for the South and non-South are reported in columns 2 and 3, respectively, in table 7.22 It is clear that this is not merely a southern phenomenon. In each region, there is strong evidence that welfare spending rises as the pivotal voter becomes poorer.
Moving down the income distribution to a new poorer decisive voter has a large effect on welfare spending. The coefficients imply that eliminating poll taxes raised welfare spending by 11-20 percent and eliminating literacy tests, when significant, brought about a 13 percent increase in welfare spending. In addition, a fall in INCOMEVOTER/INCOMEpop of .2 would result in a 5-12 percent rise in welfare spending, and the ouster of Republicans from state government by Democrats is estimated to lead to 5-12 percent higher welfare spending.
The results are somewhat less significant when the dependent variable is the share of welfare spending in total spending. Again when a two-tailed test is used, nine of the 16 coefficients in tables 3-6 are significant at the 5 percent level. The INCOMEvOTER/INCOMEpop coefficients, significant in the linear but not in the log-log models, are not as significant as they were for welfare spending. This is also the case in the regressions represented in table 7. The absolute tstatistics on the coefficients in the linear model are at least 1.25 for each region, but only one is significant at the 10 percent level. None of the coefficients in the log-log regional regressions or in the presidential elections regressions is significant. Thus, with several very different indirect and direct measures of the location of the pivotal voter on the income distribution, we find strong support for the prediction that welfare spending rises as the decisive voter moves down the income distribution. A shift in control 22 The South is defined to comprise the three census regions that contain the original Confederate states and includes Alabama, Arkansas, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Kentucky, Louisiana, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, Oklahoma, South Carolina, Tennessee, Texas, Virginia, and West Virginia. of state government from Republicans to Democrats, a fall in the income of those voting relative to that of the population, and the elimination of the poll tax and, in some specifications, the literacy test all lead to greater welfare spending. These results are robust to the use of state spending or state and local spending and in unreported regressions are insensitive to the exclusion of DEMOCRATIC CONTROL. Furthermore, our finding that welfare spending rises as voters' income relative to state income falls is confirmed in various subsamples.
Effects of Shifting the Pivotal Voter on Demand for Government Services
Changing the identity of the decisive voter has conflicting income and substitution effects on the demand for government services. As noted earlier, Kenny (1978) shows that with proportional taxes a jurisdiction's poorer citizens prefer less government services if the income elasticity for the services is larger than the elasticity of substitution between government services and other goods. The estimates of these elasticities from the empirical government spending literature are generally quite close to each other, with the income elasticity typically exceeding the elasticity of substitution. The evidence in tables 3-6 suggests that the income and price effects roughly cancel out. There is no dominant sign to the coefficients, and the few coefficients that are significant have inconsistent signs. DEMOCRATIC CONTROL never has a significant impact on nonwelfare spending. When a two-tailed test is used, two of the eight coefficients for LITERACY TEST and POLL TAX are significantly positive, but two of the four coefficients for the relative income variable are negative and significant at the 5 percent level. On net, the evidence suggests that increasing voter turnout among the poor results in no change in the level of government services provided.
Other Results
As described previously, FEDERAL GRANTS and PERSONAL IN-COME capture income effects in these models. Per capita grants from the federal government (FEDERAL GRANTS) raise nonwelfare spending and welfare spending. Federal aid also increases the share of state spending going to welfare.
As expected, a rise in real personal income per capita (PER-SONAL INCOME) leads to an increase in total state nonwelfare spending. The income elasticity (.25-.38) is somewhat smaller than estimates summarized by Fisher (1988) , which may help to explain the indirect evidence reported in the previous section that the income and price elasticities are very close to each other.
When a two-tailed test is used, income is not significantly related to welfare spending in the log-log models but has a positive and significant impact on welfare spending in the linear models. These results do not support the social insurance model of welfare spending, which predicts a negative coefficient.
As noted above, increases in INCOME SPREAD, PERCENT BLACK, and PERCENT ELDERLY are associated with an increase in the number of poor families in the state. Therefore, an increase in any one of these measures represents an increase in the actual or potential welfare recipient groups. We find that all three have a positive and generally significant effect on both per capita welfare spending and the share of welfare in the budget.23 In the state and local regressions, there is weak evidence that nonwelfare spending falls as the number of poor families rises; on the other hand, these measures are unrelated to nonwelfare spending in the state spending regressions. Perhaps local nonwelfare spending falls as the number of poor families rises.
Government services are more expensive in metropolitan areas, where wages are higher. This is expected to result in higher spending on government services. Consistent with this reasoning, PER-CENT METROPOLITAN has a positive and generally significant impact on nonwelfare spending. Most welfare expenditures go to transfer payments, which are unaffected by this variation in costs, and we find welfare spending to be unrelated to PERCENT METRO-POLITAN in the log-log models and inversely related to it in the linear models.
The unreported estimated time and state fixed effects for the welfare expenditure models can also be summarized. The coefficients for 1950-54, relative to 1988, are the largest (i.e., most positive) coefficients; the subsequent year coefficients follow no pattern. Not surprisingly, the smallest state coefficients typically are estimated for southern or mountain states, possibly reflecting differences in "tastes" for welfare in these states.
VI. Conclusion
The expansion of the voting franchise to include more poor citizens is often cited as a plausible and perhaps important explanation for the growth of government. The empirical evidence to date on this hypothesis, however, is weak and even unfavorable to any link between changes in the voting franchise and growth in government expenditures.
A closer examination of the theory helps to explain why there is meager support so far for the hypothesis that expanding the franchise results in higher total expenditures. The pure redistribution, social insurance, and political support models of welfare expenditure predict that such a change unambiguously increases government redistributive expenditures. With regard to government services, in a simple model, expanding the franchise has an uncertain, although probably negative, effect on government service expenditures. Thus, to understand the full impact of expansion of the voting franchise, it is necessary to examine both welfare and nonwelfare spending.
The U.S. Voting Rights Acts of the 1960s and early 1970s had a profound impact on voter registration and turnout, especially in the southern states. We have cited evidence that the elimination of the poll tax and literacy test brought about an increase in voter registration and turnout, particularly among the poor, and thus resulted in a new, poorer decisive voter. Consequently, examination of the impact of this legislation yields an excellent test of the relationship between changes in the voting franchise and government spending on redistributive programs and nonwelfare services. Using state expenditure data from 1950 to 1988 and state and local expenditure data from 1958 to 1988, we are able to estimate the indirect effects of poll taxes and literacy tests and the direct effects of the relative income of voters and political party control on welfare and nonwelfare spending, holding state demographic and economic characteristics constant.
With these very different measures, we have found strong support for the prediction of the pure redistribution, social insurance, and special interest group models that welfare spending rises as political power shifts from a state's richer citizens to its poorer citizens. The elimination of poll taxes, a fall in the income of voters relative to that of the population, and a shift from Republican control to Democratic control all lead to higher welfare spending. These results are inconsistent with the pure altruism model but are consistent with the altruism/self-interest model if enfranchisement adds more current or potential welfare recipients than other poor voters. Our evidence also suggests that per capita income has a positive impact on welfare spending, which is inconsistent with the social insurance model of welfare spending. Thus state welfare spending seems to be best described by the pure redistribution, special interest group, or possibly altruism/self-interest models.
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In a simple model of the demand for government services, enfranchising the poor results in greater nonwelfare government expenditures only if the income elasticity is smaller than the price elasticity, which does not appear to be the case. We found that nonwelfare government expenditures were unaffected by various measures of political influence of the poor, suggesting that the income elasticity is approximately equal to the price elasticity.
Enfranchising the poor has resulted in noticeably larger welfare spending and has had virtually no impact on nonwelfare spending. Since welfare spending is only 15 percent of the typical state's budget, the surge in welfare spending cannot account for much of the growth in state budgets over the last four decades.
